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Judson J. giving the judgment of the unanimous court allowed
the appeal, holding that rescission was not a proper remedy in this
case. The deal was closed on March 1, 1961 and the $14,000 deficiency
was not discovered until the middle of May. On May 19, Zien gave
notice of rescission and tendered the business back to Field. The
tender was rejected, hence Zien issued his writ claiming rescission
and the return of the part payment he had made in the contract, or
alternatively, damages for breach of contract. The term being a cov-
enant of the contract, the trial judge had granted rescission for its
breach. Judson J. points out that this is not an automatic legal result,
saying:
In deciding whether the remedy is rescission, with all its consequences
or damages, the emphasis should be on the seriousness of the defective
performance in the particular contract. Nothing in the way of clarity
is gained by attaching a label to the clause.
Zien knew there had been recent material changes in the business in-
volving non-recurring capital and operating expenses, such as obtain-
ing new premises and hiring additional personnel, which contributed
to the $14,000 deficiency. Hence Judson J. said that in the circum-
stances, the parties could not have intended that a breach such as this
would give rise to the right of rescission. The commercial importance
of the breach must be weighed in deciding on the remedy. The court
concluded that the remedy in this case would be damages rather than
rescission. Hence the balance owing by Zien under the agreement was
reduced by $14,000, the amount of the deficiency. Judson J. concluded
by saying "If Zien had wanted rescission for any deficiency in this
account he could have stipulated for it and it would have been en-
forced."
Generally rescission is granted for breach of a covenant that is
a condition of the contract. Whether it is desirable that this remedy
be made to depend on the facts surrounding the making of the con-
tract in each case is questionable because certainty in the law is a
basic principle in the commercial area. Also questionable is the im-
putation of an intention as to remedies for breach when in all likeli-
hood the parties did not consider the various legal possibilities. Had
they done so, Zien might have stipulated for rescission as Judson J.
suggested.
R.F.E.
Elliott v. Wedlake, [1963] S.C.R. 305.
The respondent (Wedlake) and E. (The late G. A. Elliott) were
partners in a hardware business. They made an agreement in 1954
terminating the partnership and purporting to set up a limited part-
nership (under the Limited Partnership Act, R.S.O. c. 208). Recital
3 of the agreement was as follows:
[VOL.. 3226
Suprene Court Review
And whereas it is the intention of the parties hereto that the Party of
the Second Part [the respondent] shall purchase the interest of the Party
of the First Part [El in the said Limited Partnership in accordance with
the terms hereinafter set forth in this agreement.
The agreement set out a number of covenants, those material to
the issue being:
6. Interest at 50% is to be paid to the Party of the First Part on said
sum of $90,000 [which E covenanted to contribute to the partnership
capital] or on such capital of the Party of the First Part as may remain
in the partnership from time to time, payable quarterly or as may be
required, and the Party of the Second Part is also to pay the sum of
$2,000 on account of the purchase of the share of the Party of the First
Part each year during the remainder of the lifetime of the Party of the
First Part, such payments to be made on the 31st day of January in each
year commencing January 31st, 1955.
7. In the event of the death of the Party of the First Part during the
continuance of the partnership, the personal representatives of the Party
of the First Part shall continue the partnership as limited partners on
the same terms and conditions as are herein contained excepting that the
Party of the Second Part shall be entitled to increase the annual payment
on account of the purchase of the share of the Party of the First Part...
Pursuant to the agreement, E contributed $90,000 to the partner-
ship capital, and the respondent made the annual payments towards
the purchase of E's share until 1961, when $53,000 remained unpaid.
E died in 1955 and the partnership was continued by E's executors
(the appellant) and the respondent until 1961. The partnership was
then dissolved, the assets liquidated and the debts paid. A balance of
$36,000 remained.
The appellant applied to court for a declaration of his rights
concerning this balance and the respondent's liability to the appellant.
The appellant contended that by the agreement the respondent agreed
to purchase E's interest for $90,000, hence claimed the balance of the
partnership's assets of $36,000 and judgment against the respondent
for the difference between that amount and the $53,000. Judgment
on the motion was given in favour of the appellant but the Ontario
Court of Appeal reversed that. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court
of Appeal.
Martland J. giving the judgment of the Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal. The partnership agreement did not include an agreement
for sale. The essential purpose of the agreement was to govern the
operation of the partnership. The respondent did not covenant to buy
E's capital interest, but only undertook to make specified annual
payments reducing E's capital account while the partnership lasted.
The agreement did not govern the distribution of the partnership
assets or dissolution, hence the statutory rules applied. The appellant
received only his proportionate share on the dissolution, the propor-
tions being determined by the capital interests of the partners at the
date of dissolution.
The appellant contended that clauses 6 and 7 coupled with recital
3 constituted a binding agreement by the respondent to buy E's
interest for $90,000. The court held that the clauses (which were
covenants) only obliged the respondent to pay E $2,000 a year during
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E's life, and did not constitute an agreement for sale. The clauses
were not equivocal since they were not capable of alternative con-
structions, hence did not give rise to the right to refer to the recitals
for assistance in interpretation. The clauses by themselves do not
support a construction which would lead to the establishment of an
enforceable contract of purchase and sale. Resort to recitals (which
are not covenants) may not be had to incorporate the words necessary
to give rise to such a contract.
The Court also pointed out that the $90,000 was a capital con-
tribution by E to the partnership, not an advance giving rise to a
debt. Hence the appellant's claims failed. R.F.E.
The Economical Fire Insurance Co. v. James D. Cherry & Sons Ltd.,
[1963] S.C.R. 93.
The plaintiff (respondent) was the appellant's general agent in
the fire insurance business in Quebec. The termination clause in the
agency contract provided that if the agent was not in default, his
records, use and control of expiration "shall be deemed to be the
property of the Agent and left in his undisputed possession." During
the currency of the agency, the plaintiff accumulated a number of
sub-agents who had "expirations" relating to the fire insurance they
wrote. After the contract was terminated (the agent not being in
default), the defendant invited some of the sub-agents to place their
renewal of insurance with it on a direct basis. The plaintiff sued
for breach of the termination clause, and was awarded $8,000.00 in
damages at trial. The Court of Queen's Bench, Quebec and the
Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the judgment.
Ritchie J. giving the judgment for the Supreme Court held that
the defendant violated the termination clause. He explained that
"expirations" in the insurance field includes the records of the insur-
ance agency by which the agent has the information about the insured,
the terms of his policy and the date it expires. This information
enables the agent to contact the insured regarding the maintenance
of insurance and the adjustment of the items in changing circum-
stances. This information is a valuable asset in the nature of goodwill.
By its dealings with the plaintiff's sub-agents, the defendant
obtained for its own use the benefit of the expirations, the use and
control of which it had agreed should be deemed the plaintiff's prop-
erty and be left in the plaintiff's undisputed possession. As between
the sub-agents and the plaintiff, the records might belong to the sub-
agents, but by the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant,
the records were the property of the plaintiff, and the defendant had
no right to make use of the exiprations by this indirect method. The
plaintiff having thus been deprived of a valuable asset in breach of
his contract with the defendant is entitled to substantial damages
from the defendant. R.F.E.
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